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Abstract: This research addresses the timely challenge of climate changes by investigating how a carbon 
emissions taxation scheme can be designed to reduce carbon emissions without hindering long-term 
economic development. Considering different power structures and green technology investment 
efficiencies, this research examines the optimal carbon tax design with respect to several key supply chain 
features. Our findings show that no matter whether customers are sensitive to the carbon emissions or not, 
the carbon tax should be differentiated across industry sectors, and the supply chain power structure and 
cost efficiencies in carbon emissions reduction should be taken into account. It is also crucial to have the 
proper channel leadership to achieve the sustainability objectives.  
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1 Introduction  
In World Economic Forum 20201, it is discussed that “carbon emissions from fossil fuels hit a record high 
in 2019”. Obviously, carbon policies are still in the top agenda in governments and companies all around 
the world. Although carbon emissions control policies, including mandatory carbon emissions capacities, 
carbon emissions taxes, cap-and-trade programs, and investment in carbon offsets, have been 
implemented by many developed and developing countries (Krass et al. 2013; Pezzey and Jotzo 2013), 
there have been ongoing debates about their fairness, effectiveness, and economic efficiency (Kroes et al. 
2012; Cachon 2014; Drake et al. 2015). The Paris agreement also welcomes the intended nationally 
determined contributions in a manner that facilitates the clarity, transparency and understanding of their 
contributions (United Nations 2015). It is therefore important for policy makers from all countries to 
review their existing emissions control polices and revise or develop new polices to achieve their intended 
national emissions reduction targets.  
Among the many carbon emissions control policies that support carbon emissions reduction, the 
carbon emissions tax is one of the popular carbon control policies that can be implemented from the 
perspective of government policy makers. In Europe, although there is no uniform carbon tax at the 
European Union level, carbon taxes have been enacted or proposed in a number of countries, such as 
Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and the UK. The carbon tax in British Columbia, Canada, is regarded by the 
Carbon Tax Centre as the most significant carbon tax in the Western Hemisphere (Komanoff and Gordon 
2015). A carbon tax was imposed at $10 (Canadian) per ton of CO2 initially in 2008 and then incremented 
by $5/tonne annually until 2012 (Park et al. 2015). Moreover, in addition to variations in the tax level 
among the existing carbon taxation schemes implemented by many countries, there are also differences 
in the mechanisms of how a carbon tax is collected (TCT 2016). For instance, a carbon tax may be paid 
only by the upstream supply chain members at the point where fuels are extracted from the earth, with 
the cost of the tax then being passed to the downstream of commerce. Alternatively, a carbon tax can be 
imposed downstream of the supply chains (e.g., on retailers or service providers) when services or 
products are purchased or to each organisation based on the amount of carbon dioxide it emits. 
 
1 https://www.weforum.org/events/world-economic-forum-annual-meeting-2020/sessions/forging-a-path-




Despite its wide recognition as a powerful policy mechanism to reduce carbon emissions, carbon 
taxation schemes also receive a substantial amount of criticisms. For example, carbon tax schemes make 
the costs associated with controlling carbon emissions overly explicit (Metcalf 2009), which leads to 
increased operating costs and therefore higher prices for products. Hoel (1996) argues that carbon 
intensive tradeable sectors should face a lower carbon tax than other sectors of the economy because the 
tax simply relocates CO2 emissions to countries that have no carbon tax. Therefore, it is important for 
governments to examine the trade-off between environmental benefits and economic losses when a 
carbon emissions tax is determined and implemented. In 2014, Australia became the first country to 
abolish the carbon tax, replacing it with the Emissions Reduction Fund, which is paid by tax payers from 
consolidated revenue (CTC 2016). There is also ongoing debate in the literature about whether a carbon 
tax should be differentiated across industry sectors. Different industry sectors may show common or 
distinctive characteristics. For instance, industrial firms are often operating within supply chains and 
power relationships within the supply chains may vary between different sectors (Cox 2004; Williams et 
al. 2011; Touboulic et al. 2014). For example, supermarket chains play a dominant role in the grocery 
food supply chain in most developed countries. Oil producers and miners are the dominant parties in the 
energy and mining sector, respectively. Manufacturers have more power in heavy construction and 
materials. Each sector also exhibits different levels of effectiveness in reducing carbon emissions via 
green technology investment. For instance, the heavy machinery sector may be more effective in using 
green technology to achieve emissions reduction than the retail sector. It is essential to explore whether 
these characteristics should be taken into consideration when developing a new carbon tax.  
A thoughtful carbon tax design will address many of these concerns. The main objective of this 
study is to explore the optimal design of carbon emissions tax that not only meets carbon emissions 
reduction targets but also achieves the sustainable economic development. The evaluation of optimal 
carbon tax design also requires the consideration of some key characteristics of different industrial sectors, 
especially the supply chain power structure and efficiency of green technology investment. To achieve 
the objective, the following questions are discussed in this paper.  
(1) How should the carbon emissions tax be designed to optimise the economic and environmental 





(2) To what extent does the supply chain power structure have an impact on the optimal design of 
the carbon emissions tax and the associated economic and environmental performances? 
(3) How does the green technology investment efficiency of supply chain members affect the optimal 
design of the carbon emissions tax and the associated economic and environmental performances? 
To answer these questions, we consider a two-echelon supply chain that consists of a manufacturer 
and a retailer in three different game models: the Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) model, the Nash model, 
and the Retailer Stackelberg (RS) model. Three different supply chain power structures are analytically 
modelled using non-cooperative game theory that focuses on the interaction of supply chain members 
characterised by the different orders of event sequence. Through a comparison of the optimal decisions 
on carbon emissions tax design and the associated economic and environmental performances derived in 
each game model, our research systematically examines the effects of the supply chain power structure 
on carbon tax decisions and performances. Furthermore, we also analyse the impact of the efficiencies of 
green technology investment in carbon emissions reduction on the optimal carbon tax design and 
performances. Moreover, to enhance the adaptability, we also discuss the optimal carbon emissions policy 
design and supply chain power structure effects under the scenarios with and without carbon emissions 
sensitive demand. 
Our analysis leads to many interesting insights. From the policy maker’s perspective, an optimal 
design of carbon tax design that delivers the environmental and economic sustainability of the supply 
chain highly depends on the power structure of the supply chain. More specifically, when the supply chain 
power structure is asymmetric, collecting more carbon emissions taxes from the follower will induce the 
entire supply chain to invest more in the green technology and gain more economic benefits. When the 
supply chain power structure is symmetric, the carbon emissions tax should be allocated to both the 
manufacturer and the retailer to minimise the unit carbon emissions and to maximise total profit. From 
the individual firms’ view, the optimal decision for green technology investment depends on the 
investment cost coefficient of supply chain members. A carbon tax should be differentiated across 
industry sectors, and the characteristics of the supply chain power structure and cost efficiencies in carbon 
emissions reduction should be taken into account. It is also crucial to have the right channel leadership to 
achieve the objectives of sustainability. These findings not only help firms make important operational 
and technology investment decisions to improve their competitive advantages but also support policy 




The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical background by 
reviewing the relevant literature, which is followed by the models and equilibrium analysis in Section 3. 
Section 4 analyse the optimal design of the carbon emissions tax under asymmetric and symmetric supply 
chain power structures, respectively. Then, the effects of supply chain power structurer are discussed in 
Section 5. Section 6 extends the modelling to the demand function that customers are sensitive to carbon 
emissions and discusses the optimal carbon emissions tax design and the effects of supply chain power 
structure. Section 7 discusses the main research findings, managerial relevance and insights, and policy 
implications. Finally, we present our concluding remarks by highlighting research contribution and future 
research directions in Section 8, respectively. All technical proofs are placed in the appendix. 
2 Research background and related literature  
To outline the research background and highlight our contributions, we reviewed the relevant literature 
focusing on three key streams: (i) the effect of carbon emissions tax schemes on supply chain decisions 
(ii) green/sustainable supply chain management considering the power structure, and (iii) the role of green 
technology investment in carbon emissions reduction. 
Compared to other carbon emissions control regulatory policies such as cap-and-trade, there are 
relatively few studies that investigate operations decisions under carbon emissions taxation schemes. 
Penkuhn et al. (1997) is one of the early pioneering studies which integrates emissions taxes into a 
nonlinear programming model for joint production planning problems in the context of process industries. 
Letmathe and Balakrishnan (2005) develop a linear mixed integer programming model that calculates the 
optimal production quantities and product mix quantities under different environmental constraints 
including the emissions tax. Bouchery et al. (2012) incorporate sustainability criteria into the classical 
economic order quantity model and examine the effectiveness of different regulatory policies to control 
carbon emissions, including the carbon tax. Choi (2013a) explores the impacts of different carbon 
emissions tax formats on the supplier selection problem in the context of the fashion apparel supply chain. 
His investigation on the effects of the carbon footprint taxation scheme on the optimal choice of the 
sourcing decision also reveals that a properly designed carbon taxation scheme can not only entice the 
fashion retailer to source from a local manufacturer but also mitigate risk for the fashion retailer (Choi 
2013b). More research has been carried out in recent years to examine how carbon emissions tax policies 




production quantity (Chen and Hao 2015; He et al. 2015), supply chain design and planning (Fahimnia 
et al. 2015; Jiang and Chen 2016; Turken et al. 2017), transportation sourcing and mode selection (Wang 
et al. 2015a; Li et al. 2017). However, most of the abovementioned studies consider carbon emissions 
taxation as a new factor or constraint and concentrate on optimising supply chain decisions (e.g., 
inventory, pricing, and product mix) with carbon emission tax as an additional consideration. Few 
researchers have attempted to study carbon emissions tax design through modelling supply chain firms’ 
behaviours and the resulting economic and environmental performances. 
Another relevant stream of literature examines the impact of the supply chain power structure on 
firms’ operational decisions. The majority of studies on the supply chain power structure focus on vertical 
competition between manufacturers and their customers or between manufacturers and their suppliers 
(Xiao et al. 2014; Chen and Wang 2015; Chen et al. 2017). In the context of green or sustainable supply 
chain management, Touboulic et al. (2014) investigate an imbalanced supply chain relationship for 
sustainability, and their study illustrates the influences of power on how supply chain members manage 
their relationships and its effect on organisational responses to sustainability implementation. Wang et al. 
(2018) present a novel technique to evaluate and assess the network-oriented risks in sustainable product-
service systems (SusPSSs) to minimise the material use and emissions. Considering the supply chain 
power relationship, Chen et al. (2017) design a two-part tariff contract is to coordinate the supply chain 
with a goal of optimising the economic and environmental performance. Although their research 
considered the carbon emission attribute as a decision variable, they do not incorporate any carbon 
emission control policies e.g. carbon tax or cap-and-trade. Park et al. (2015) examine the impact of the 
carbon tax on the equilibrium supply chain structure and social welfare. Their findings show that the 
carbon cost can significantly influence the supply chain structure when there is intense market 
competition. Their research also suggests the importance of imposing the optimal carbon tax to curb 
emissions. Du et al. (2015) investigate the behaviour and decision making of each supply chain member 
in the cap-and-trade system. Their study develops a game theoretical analytical model, in which supply 
chain players’ bargaining power is affected by exogenous factors. Considering the carbon emissions tax, 
Chen and Hao (2015) investigate two competing firms’ optimal pricing and production policies with a 
balanced power structure. The two abovementioned studies only consider the balanced power structure 
and obtain a Nash equilibrium. Different industry sectors, such as the energy, steel, fashion, and grocery 




2015; Chen et al. 2016). Other supply chain power structures, such as the asymmetric power relationship, 
also influence the efficacy of carbon emission tax for a low carbon supply chain. It will be important to 
incorporate the power factor into the exploration of optimal carbon tax design from the supply chain 
perspective. This research aims to address this gap in the literature by systematically examining the effects 
that the supply chain power structure has on a low-carbon supply chain under carbon emissions taxation 
schemes. 
To reduce carbon emissions, it is essential to encourage organisations to invest in green and cleaner 
technologies and to adopt green practices in their processes (Wiesenthal et al. 2012; Drake et al. 2015; 
Chiou et al. 2011; Luo et al. 2016; Xu et al. 2017). Technological investment is considered to be a strategic 
decision for organisations to control carbon emissions, and many firms regard such investments as 
possible alternatives for gaining or maintaining competitive advantage (Krass et al. 2013; Wang et al. 
2013; Chen and Wang 2016; Govindan et al. 2019). Although investment in greener and cleaner 
technologies to make these processes energy efficient will reduce the carbon footprint of the supply chain, 
the cost associated with green technology investment poses major barriers for its wide adoption in industry. 
Organisations are interested in opportunities in which both economic performance and environmental 
performance can be improved (Baker and Solak 2014); therefore, a quick return on investment is the key 
driver for green technology implementation in various supply chain cases. Han et al. (2017) build a 
mixed-integer linear programming model for a real-world firm to study how to select weight reduction 
technology and design a supply chain network considering carbon emissions restrictions. Using the 
Stackelberg game between a regulator and a firm, Krass et al. (2013) examine the role that environmental 
taxation can play in reducing environmental pollution and inducing the choice of greener technology by 
a profit-maximising firm. Similarly, Drake et al. (2015) combine the economic and operations approaches 
and analyse the technology choice under emissions regulations including both tax and cap-and-trade 
regulatory regimes. Considering a government and two competing firms who sell products and face price 
and pollution sensitive customers, Bi et al. (2017) examine the government’s subsidy policy as well as 
the two firms’ selling prices and technology investment. As opposed to the abovementioned studies, 
which only examine one firm’s or horizontal firms’ technology choice and operations decisions such as 
price and capacity, our research concentrates on firms’ green technology decisions and operations 
decisions in the context of a supply chain. Ultimately, achieving the carbon emissions reduction objective 




supply chains.  
The main issues and important findings in this field are summarized in Table 1. However, most 
existing research in the literature mainly examines the carbon emissions tax from an economic perspective 
(Wissema and Dellink 2007; Mathur and Morris 2014), and little attention has been paid to carbon 
emissions tax design that considers how firms and supply chains behave under the carbon emissions tax, 
and how their behaviour affects both economic and environmental performances. In contrast, most of the 
supply chain management literature on carbon emissions taxation focuses on optimising supply chain 
decisions under different carbon tax schemes (Choi 2013a; Choi 2013b; Wang et al. 2015a). Most 
companies will respond to government policies strategically and operationally to maximise their own 
benefits. Therefore, it is important for policy makers to understand how firms will react to new policies 
and the consequential economic and environmental performances when they develop new carbon 
emissions control polices. There are only a few studies (Krass et al. 2013; Drake et al. 2015) that examine 
the government’s environmental policies (including carbon taxation) from the policymaker perspective 
by modelling firms’ decisions on pricing and green technology. However, the studies by Krass et al. (2013) 
and Drake et al. (2015) mainly concentrate on individual firms’ decision behaviours and the 
corresponding performance without considering the interactions among supply chain partners. To meet 
the objectives of sustainability, a coordinated effort is required to reduce the carbon emissions of the 
entire supply chain. To the best of our knowledge, very little research has been undertaken that focuses 
on the carbon emissions tax design by exploring supply chain features and examining the associated 
economic and environmental performances. This paper hence contributes to the literature by filling this 
research gap. 
Table 1 Summary of related literature 
Key streams Related references Issues 





Penkuhn et al. (1997); Letmathe and 
Balakrishnan (2005); Bouchery et al. 
(2012); Chen and Hao (2015); He et al. 
(2015) 
Pricing and production quantity 
Choi (2013a); Choi (2013b) Supplier selection 
Wang et al. (2015a) Transportation mode selections 
Rosic and Jammemegg (2013) Purchasing 










Touboulic et al. (2014)  
Imbalanced supply chain relationship for 
sustainability 
Wang et al. (2018) 
Evaluate network-oriented risks in sustainable 
product-service systems  
Chen et al. (2017) 
Coordinate supply chain without carbon 
emission control policies 
Park et al. (2015) 
Impacts of the carbon tax on the equilibrium 
supply chain structure  
Du et al. (2015); Chen and Hao (2015) 
Pricing or production policies with a balanced 
power structure 





Han et al. (2017) 
Weight reduction technology selection and 
supply chain network design for a firm  
Krass et al. (2013) 
Role of taxation on green technology between a 
regulator and a firm 
Drake et al. (2015) 
One firm’s technology choice under emissions 
regulations 
Govindan and Sivakumar (2016) 
Carbon emission reduction by using recycle 
products in the production process 
Bi et al. (2017) 
Government’s subsidy policy and two horizontal 
firms’ selling prices and technology investment 
3 The models and equilibrium analysis 
3.1 Model formulation and assumption 
We consider a two-echelon supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and a retailer. The retailer 
purchases products from the manufacturer and sells to end customers. Throughout this paper, we use the 
parameters and variables notated as follows in Table 2. 
Table 2 Notations 
Notation Descriptions 
𝑐 Manufacturer’s unit production cost. 
𝑤 Manufacturer’s unit wholesale price, 𝑤 > 𝑐. 
𝑒0 Initial unit carbon emissions. 
𝑒𝑚 Manufacturer’s unit carbon emissions after green technology investment. 
𝑡𝑚 Manufacturer’s green technology investment cost coefficient. 
𝑇𝑚 Manufacturer’s green technology investments, 𝑇𝑚 = 𝑡𝑚(𝑒0 − 𝑒𝑚)
2. 




𝑒 Supply chain’s unit carbon emissions after green technology investment, 𝑒 = 𝑒𝑚 + 𝑒𝑟 . 
𝑡𝑟 Retailer’s green technology investment cost coefficient. 
𝑇𝑟 Retailer’s green technology investments, 𝑇𝑟 = 𝑡𝑟(𝑒0 − 𝑒𝑟)
2. 
𝑝 Retailer’s unit retail price, 𝑝 > 𝑤. 
𝑚 Retailer’s margin profit, 𝑚 = 𝑝 − 𝑤. 
𝑞 Demand faced by the retailer. 
𝜏 Supply chain’s unit carbon emissions tax imposed by the government. 
𝜃 The ratio of carbon emissions tax absorbed by the manufacturer, 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1. 
1 − 𝜃 The ratio of carbon emissions tax absorbed by the retailer. 
There are three key assumptions in this paper as stated in the following. 
(1) The demand faced by the retailer is price-sensitive, that is, 𝑞 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝, where 𝛼 is the initial 
market and 𝛽 means self-price sensitivity (Yalabik and Fairchild 2011). The linear demand function has 
been used extensively in the literature relating to pricing and supply chain research as an acceptable 
approximation of demand (Shin and Tunca 2010; Shang et al. 2016). Besides, we use the linear demand 
function because it is more analytically tractable and helps derive closed-form insights. In Section 6, we 
extend the price-sensitive demand function to the demand function that is both price-sensitive and carbon-
emissions-sensitive. 
(2) Both the manufacturer and the retailer are assumed to actively undertake green technology 
investment. This assumption is reasonable as carbon emission reduction is not only the responsibility of 
the dominant party in a supply chain but also other parties within the supply chain. For example, when 
Sainsbury’s, a leading supermarket chain in the United Kingdom, pledges to halve plastic packaging by 
2025, they also call for their suppliers to come forward with new technologies and business models (BBC 
2019). According to CDP’s Global Supply Chain Report 2018, Sky, the European entertainment and 
telecommunications giant, is in partnership with a key supplier, to develop circular economy model for 
its new set-top box with the aim of creating a closed loop system with zero waste to landfill (CDP 2019). 
(3) The unit carbon emissions tax 𝜏, is assumed to be an exogenous parameter. The reason is that 
the unit carbon emissions tax depends on the government’s goal about total carbon emissions reduction. 
In this paper, we focus on how the carbon emissions tax should be allocated between the manufacturer 
and the retailer.  




𝜋𝑚(𝑤, 𝑒𝑚) = 𝑤𝑞 − 𝑐𝑞 − 𝑇𝑚 − 𝜃𝜏(𝑒𝑚 + 𝑒𝑟)𝑞.  (1) 
The first term is the revenue from product wholesaling. The second term indicates the production 
costs. The last two terms represent the green technology investments and carbon emissions tax absorbed 
by the manufacturer, respectively.  
Similarly, the retailer’s profit, denoted by 𝜋𝑟(𝑝, 𝑒𝑟), is: 
𝜋𝑟(𝑝, 𝑒𝑟) = 𝑝𝑞 − 𝑤𝑞 − 𝑇𝑟 − (1 − 𝜃)𝜏(𝑒𝑚 + 𝑒𝑟)𝑞.  (2) 
The first term means the revenue from product retail sales. The second term represents the purchase 
cost. The last two terms are the green technology investments and carbon emissions tax absorbed by the 
retailer, respectively.  
The total supply chain’s profit, denoted by 𝜋, is 𝜋 = 𝜋𝑚(𝑤, 𝑒𝑚) + 𝜋𝑟(𝑝, 𝑒𝑟). That is: 
𝜋 = [𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝜏(𝑒𝑚 + 𝑒𝑟)](𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝) − 𝑡𝑚(𝑒0 − 𝑒𝑚)
2 − 𝑡𝑟(𝑒0 − 𝑒𝑟)
2. (3) 
The problem faced by the manufacturer is to decide the unit wholesale price (𝑤) and its unit carbon 




Similarly, the problem faced by the retailer is to decide the optimal unit retail price (𝑝) and its unit 




The problem faced by the policy maker is to design the ratio of carbon emissions tax absorbed by 
the manufacturer (𝜃) to minimise the supply chain’s unit carbon emissions and to maximise the total 
supply chain’s profit simultaneously so as to achieve a trade-off between economic efficiency and 








Where superscript 𝑖 = 𝑚, 𝑛, 𝑟 represents the MS model, the Nash model, and the RS model, respectively. 
From the environment point of view, the policy marker’s goal is to reduce the total carbon emissions to 
be consistent with the Paris Climate arrangement. To achieve this environmental goal, they can implement 




output of product. However, the policy maker also has the responsibility of sustaining economic growth 
from the economic point of view. Producing fewer products may have negative impact on the financial 
performance of the supply chain and its members as well as the wide economy. Reducing product unit 
carbon emissions is a more effective and sustainable approach to achieve the goal of reducing the total 
carbon emissions.  
3.2 The equilibriums 
According to the power structure, there are three game models: the MS model, the Nash model, and the 
RS model. Among the three abovementioned models, the MS model and the RS model are asymmetric, 
and the Nash model is symmetric. These three power structures are commonly seen in practice (Shi et al. 
2014). For instance, in an automobile manufacturing supply chain, the manufacturers usually have more 
power than the retailers and act as the leader in the supply chain. Some powerful supermarkets, like Wal-
Mart, play a dominant role compared with most of their upstream suppliers or manufacturers in the supply 
chain. There is a more balanced power structure between fashion brands and department stores in the 
fashion industry such as Zara and its main supplier, AHA (Wilhelm 2016). Empirical evidence from the 
work of Cotterill and Putsis (2001) also supports that a Nash game can be employed to model the strategic 
interaction between supply chain parties for a number of product categories. 
3.2.1 Asymmetric supply chain power structure models 
Asymmetric supply chain power structures (the MS and RS power structures) are characterised by the 
different sequences in which the wholesale and retail prices and unit carbon emissions are determined by 
the manufacturer and the retailer, respectively. More detailed interpretations are as follows: 
Manufacturer-Stackelberg is widely adopted in the operations and supply chain literature and we 
follow the standard approach reported in the literature (SeyedEsfahani et al. 2011; Zhang et al. 2012; Shi 
et al. 2013) to outline the decision sequence in the MS model. With the carbon emissions tax given by the 
government that includes the unit carbon emissions tax and the ratio to be absorbed, the manufacturer 
moves first as the Stackelberg leader setting the wholesale price and unit carbon emissions. The retailer 
is the follower and decides the retail price and unit carbon emissions based on the manufacturer’s 
wholesale price and unit carbon emissions. The manufacturer takes the retailer's reaction function into 
consideration for the respective wholesale price and unit carbon emission decisions. The decision process 






𝜋𝑚(𝑤, 𝑒𝑚) → 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑝,𝑒𝑟
𝜋𝑟(𝑝, 𝑒𝑟). 
Similarly, we follow the standard Retailer-Stackelberg approach reported in the literature to outline 
the decision sequence in the RS model (Huang and Li 2001; Shi et al. 2013; Xiao et al. 2014). With the 
carbon emissions tax given by the government, the retailer moves first as the Stackelberg leader setting 
the retail price and unit carbon emissions. The manufacturer is the follower and decides the wholesale 
price and unit carbon emissions based on the retailer’s retail price and unit carbon emissions. The retailer 
takes the manufacturer's reaction function into consideration for the respective retail price and unit carbon 
emission decisions. The decision process of the RS model is: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑝,𝑒𝑟
𝜋𝑟(𝑝, 𝑒𝑟) → 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑤,𝑒𝑚
𝜋𝑚(𝑤, 𝑒𝑚). 
3.2.2 Symmetric structure model 
In the symmetric structure (Nash) model, a Nash equilibrium exists between the two supply chain 
members. We follow the standard game theoretical approach reported in the literature (Chen et al. 2019; 
SeyedEsfahani et al. 2011; Chen and Wang 2015) to describe the decision sequence in the Nash model. 
First, the policy maker gives the ratio of carbon emissions tax at the beginning of the game. Then, the 
manufacturer sets the wholesale price and the unit carbon emissions and the retailer sets the retail price 
and the unit carbon emissions simultaneously. Finally, when customer demand is realised, the 









Table 3 shows the manufacturer’s optimal unit wholesale price (𝑤𝑖) and unit carbon emissions (𝑒𝑚
𝑖 ), 
and the retailer’s optimal retail price (𝑝𝑖) and unit carbon emissions (𝑒𝑟
𝑖 ) in the presence of the carbon 
emissions tax in the aforementioned power structure models (𝑖 = 𝑚, 𝑟, 𝑛). The proofs of these expressions 
are placed in Appendix. 
Table 3 The manufacturer’s and retailer’s optimal decisions in each power structure model 




− 2(1 − 𝜃)𝜏𝑒0
−
(𝛼 − 𝑐𝛽 − 2𝛽𝜏𝑒0)[4𝑡𝑚𝑡𝑟 − 𝛽(1 − 𝜃)𝜏
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2𝜏2]
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8𝑡𝑚𝑡𝑟 − 𝛽𝜏
2𝑡𝑟 − 2𝛽(1 − 𝜃)𝜏
2𝑡𝑚
 𝑒0 −















2𝑡𝑚𝑡𝑟(𝛼 − 𝑐𝛽 − 2𝛽𝜏𝑒0)
𝛽[8𝑡𝑚𝑡𝑟 − 𝛽𝜏














2𝑡𝑚𝑡𝑟(𝛼 − 𝑐𝛽 − 2𝛽𝜏𝑒0)




𝑖  𝑒0 −
(1 − 𝜃)𝜏𝑡𝑚(𝛼 − 𝑐𝛽 − 2𝛽𝜏𝑒0)
8𝑡𝑚𝑡𝑟 − 𝛽𝜏
2𝑡𝑟 − 2𝛽(1 − 𝜃)𝜏
2𝑡𝑚
 𝑒0 −





(1 − 𝜃)𝜏𝑡𝑚(𝛼 − 𝑐𝛽 − 2𝛽𝜏𝑒0)
6𝑡𝑚𝑡𝑟 − 𝛽[𝑡𝑚(1 − 𝜃) + 𝑡𝑟𝜃]𝜏
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4 Optimal carbon tax 
In this section, we discuss how to design the optimal ratio of carbon emissions tax absorbed by the 
manufacturer in the asymmetric supply chain power structure models (MS and RS models) and the 
symmetric structure model (Nash model) from the perspective of the supply chain’s environmental 
performance and supply chain’s profit. Several interesting findings can be obtained. 
4.1 Optimal carbon tax in the asymmetric supply chain power structure 
As to the optimal ratio of carbon emissions tax absorbed by the manufacturer in the asymmetric supply 
chain power structure models (MS and RS models), we propose following Theorem. The superscripts 𝑚 
and 𝑟 depict the MS model and the RS model, respectively. Moreover, the superscripts 𝑚𝑐 and 𝑟𝑐 
indicate the situation to minimise the unit carbon emissions of the supply chain in the MS and RS models, 
respectively. Besides, the superscripts 𝑚𝑝 and 𝑟𝑝 indicate the situation to maximize the profit of the 
supply chain in the MS and RS models, respectively. 
Theorem 1: (1) To minimise the supply chain’s unit carbon emissions with green technology 
investment, 𝜽𝒎𝒄 = 𝟎 and 𝜽𝒓𝒄 = 𝟏. 
(2) To gain the maximum profit of the supply chain with green technology investment, 𝜽𝒎𝒑 = 𝟎 
and 𝜽𝒓𝒑 = 𝟏. 
(3) To minimise the supply chain’s unit carbon emissions and maximise the supply chain’s total 
profit, 𝜽𝒎 = 𝟎 and 𝜽𝒓 = 𝟏. 
From (1) to (3) in Theorem 1, the optimal solution for the carbon emissions taxation is to tax the 
follower in the asymmetric supply chain power structures (𝜃𝑖 ) in order to minimize the unit carbon 
emissions and maximize the economic benefit for the supply chain. Interestingly, the aforementioned 
optimal taxation solution is mainly dependent on the power structure but not influenced by the green 
technology investment cost coefficients (𝑡𝑚 or 𝑡𝑟). This may be explained by the fact that if the carbon 
emissions tax is collected only from the leader, the supply chain follower will not take the government’s 
carbon emissions tax policy into account in the decision making of wholesale/retail prices and green 




imposed on the follower, they have to consider the taxation policy when making decisions on 
wholesale/retail prices and green technology investments. Meanwhile, the supply chain leader is able to 
respond to the follower’s decisions for respective operational decisions. Comparing to a taxation on the 
supply chain leader that only influences leader’s decision, collecting carbon emissions tax from the 
follower will have an impact on decision making of both supply chain parties in the asymmetric power 
structure. Therefore, it is more likely for the policy makers to design an optimal taxation scheme to induce 
supply chain parties to invest more in green technologies and improve the environmental and economic 
performance of the supply chain.    
For policy makers, collecting more carbon emissions taxes from the follower will induce both the 
manufacturer and the retailer to invest more in green technology. Meanwhile, the profits of the 
manufacturer, the retailer and the supply chain are all higher. This increase may be explained by the fact 
that, on the one hand, the follower will adjust its decisions on pricing and its green technology investment 
based on the carbon emissions tax imposed on it. On the other hand, the supply chain leader is able to 
respond to the follower’s decisions to make its decisions on pricing and green technology investments to 
optimise its performance. By contrast, the optimisation of environmental and economic performances 
cannot be achieved if the carbon emissions tax is collected only from the leader because the supply chain 
follower will not be able to optimise its pricing and investment decisions according to the carbon 
emissions tax.  
For the relationships between the manufacturer’s optimal green technology investment (𝑇𝑚
𝑖 ) and the 
retailer’s optimal green technology investment (𝑇𝑟
𝑖) in the MS model and in the RS model, respectively, 
under the scenarios with the optimal ratio of carbon emissions tax absorbed by the manufacturer (𝜃𝑖), 
where 𝑖 = 𝑚, 𝑟, the following lemma can be obtained. 


















𝑟  and 𝑇𝑟
𝑟 ) are decided only by the firm’s investment cost 
coefficients (𝑡𝑚 and 𝑡𝑟) and not by the supply chain’s power structure under the above optimal carbon 
emissions tax (𝜃𝑖) design, and the firm with a lower green investment cost coefficient will invest more in 
green technology. The above results are shown in Figure 1 to clearly outline the relationships between 




phenomenon may be explained by the fact that the firm with a low green technology investment cost 
coefficient is more efficient in its carbon emissions reduction. Hence, the firm with greater carbon 
emissions reduction efficiency can invest more in green technology to achieve the optimal economic and 
environmental performances. Fundamentally, carbon emissions reduction requires green technology 
investments by all supply chain parties to improve carbon efficiency.  
 
Therefore, to achieve the objective of sustainability, both the power structure and the green 
technology investment cost coefficients (𝑡𝑚 and 𝑡𝑟 ) of supply chain members should be taken into 
consideration for the development of carbon emissions control policies. Overall, Theorem 1 and Lemma 
1 show some interesting results, which are summarised in the following remark. 
Remark 1: The optimal carbon tax design is mainly influenced by the supply chain power 
structure. By contrast, the optimal decision on green technology investment depends on the green 
technology investment cost coefficients of supply chain members. 
This remark means that, in an imbalanced supply chain power structure, the policy maker should 
consider the power relationship between supply chain members when designing carbon taxation schemes 
(𝜃𝑖). Meanwhile, firms’ green technology investment (𝑇𝑚
𝑖  and 𝑇𝑟
𝑖) decisions are mainly affected by their 
efficiencies (𝑡𝑚 and 𝑡𝑟 ) in carbon emissions reduction. Therefore, the policy maker should develop 
appropriate policies that incentivize those firms with greater carbon emissions reduction efficiency, i.e., 
the lower green technology investment cost coefficient, to invest more in green technology to achieve 
sustainable economic and environmental development. 























Similarly, to design the optimal ratio of carbon emissions tax absorbed by the manufacturer from the 
perspective of the supply chain’s unit carbon emissions and profit, the following theorem can be obtained. 
The superscript 𝑛 depicts the Nash model. In addition, the superscript 𝑛𝑐 indicates the situation to 
minimise the unit carbon emissions of the supply chain in the Nash model. And the superscript 𝑛𝑝 
indicates the situation to maximize the profit of the supply chain in the Nash model. 
Theorem 2: (1) To gain the supply chain’s minimum unit carbon emissions with green technology 
investment, if 𝒕𝒎 > 𝒕𝒓, then 𝜽
𝒏𝒄 = 𝟎  if 𝒕𝒎 = 𝒕𝒓, then 𝜽
𝒏𝒄 can be an arbitrary value in the interval 
[0,1]  if 𝒕𝒎 < 𝒕𝒓, then 𝜽
𝒏𝒄 = 𝟏. 























 , then 
𝜽𝒏𝒑 = 𝟏. 
(3) Considering the supply chain’s minimum unit carbon emissions and the supply chain’s 





























, then 𝜽𝒏 = 𝟎. 
Parts (1) to (3) of Theorem 2 mean that, to minimise the supply chain’s unit carbon emissions and 
maximise the supply chain’s profit, the optimal ratio exists and is affected by the relationship between 
the manufacturer’s green investment cost coefficient ( 𝑡𝑚 ) and the retailer’s green investment cost 
coefficient (𝑡𝑟). Besides, the optimal design of the carbon emissions tax is determined by two thresholds, 








). The two thresholds lead to three decision 
intervals. As illustrated in Figure 2, these intervals have important implication for the design of the carbon 
tax, in this case, the optimal ratio of carbon emissions tax absorbed by the manufacturer (𝜃𝑛). For instance, 









), the policy maker should only collect carbon emissions tax from 
the firm with greater emissions reduction efficiency. When the manufacturer’s green investment cost 








), the carbon emissions 













); similarly, region I(b) depicts that if the 








 ). Thus, the firm with greater emissions reduction efficiency, i.e., with a lower green 
investment cost coefficient, will be subject to a higher carbon emissions tax. The efficiency in carbon 
emissions reduction through green technology investment varies between different industry sectors as 
well as companies at different stages of a supply chain, such as manufacturers, logistics providers, and 
retailers. For instance, green technology investment may have a more significant impact on the 
transportation and logistics sector than on the retail sector. As noted in the previous literature, the 
upstream of the supply chain contributes to the majority of the environmental loads on energy 
consumption (Raz et al. 2013; Wang et al. 2015b). Green technology investment in the upstream of the 
supply chain is more likely to make a greater contribution to carbon emissions reduction compared to 
investment in the downstream of the supply chain. Therefore, it is vital for policy makers to not only take 
this factor into account when designing the carbon emissions tax but also provide more incentives for the 
upstream supply chain parties to invest in green technologies when using the carbon tax revenue. 
 
Regarding the relationships between the manufacturer’s optimal green technology investments (𝑇𝑚
𝑛) 
and the retailer’s optimal green technology investments (𝑇𝑟
𝑛) under the scenarios with the optimal ratio 
of carbon emissions tax absorbed by the manufacturer, the following lemma can be obtained. 
Lemma 2: If 𝒕𝒎 > 𝒕𝒓, 𝑻𝒎
𝒏 < 𝑻𝒓
𝒏  if 𝒕𝒎 = 𝒕𝒓, 𝑻𝒎
𝒏 = 𝑻𝒓
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Region I: the region of





Lemma 2 indicates that the firm’s optimal green technology investment (𝑇𝑖
𝑛 ) is decided by the 
investment cost coefficient (𝑡𝑚 and 𝑡𝑟), and the firm with a lower green investment cost coefficient will 
invest more in green technology. A comparison of the investment levels of the same player in both 
asymmetric and symmetric structure cases, we can conclude that the relationships between the 
manufacturer’s and retailer’s optimal green technology investments are decided only by the firm’s 
investment cost coefficients and not by the supply chain’s power structure. 
5 The power structure effect  
In this section, we discuss the effect of different power structures on the optimal carbon tax design (𝜃𝑖) 
and the unit carbon emissions. Recall Theorem 1, the optimal carbon ratio absorbed by the manufacturer 
in the MS model and the RS model is 𝜃𝑚 = 0 and 𝜃𝑟 = 1 , respectively. Additionally, the optimal 
carbon ratio in the Nash model is illustrated in Figure 2. Hence, we can obtain the following corollary: 
Corollary 1: 𝜽𝒎 ≤ 𝜽𝒏 ≤ 𝜽𝒓. 
This corollary means that, if the manufacturer is the leader, then the optimal ratio of carbon emissions 
tax absorbed by the manufacturer (𝜃𝑚 ) is lowest for carbon emissions minimisation and profit 
maximisation. By contrast, the optimal ratio is highest when it is the follower (𝜃𝑖). This phenomenon 
demonstrates that the supply chain power structure has a profound effect on the optimal carbon emissions 
tax design to optimise the environmental and economic performances. Unfortunately, the supply chain 
power structure has often been ignored by policy makers in the development of carbon tax schemes. In 
reality, different industry sectors, such as the steel, telecommunication, and grocery store sectors, have 
unique supply chain power structures. It is important for policy makers to incorporate such difference 
into the design of the carbon tax. 
To explore the effect of the power structures on the optimal ratio of carbon emissions tax from the 
perspective of minimising the carbon emissions and maximising the profit (𝜃𝑖), we consider a scenario 
that excludes the effect of the green technology investment cost coefficients, and assume that 𝑡𝑚 = 𝑡𝑟 =
𝑡. Following theorem can be obtained, where the superscripts 𝑚𝑡, 𝑟𝑡 and 𝑛𝑡 indicate the situation with 
the same green technology investment cost coefficients of the manufacturer and the retailer in the MS, 







𝒏𝒕 and 𝒆𝒎𝒕 = 𝒆𝒓𝒕 < 𝒆𝒏𝒕, when 𝒕𝒎 = 𝒕𝒓 = 𝒕.  




of the manufacturer, the retailer and the supply chain are equal and are all lower than those in the 
symmetric power structure. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that a supply chain leader in 
the symmetric structure is lacking and the implementation of a low-carbon supply chain often requires a 
leader to impose through strategic and operational decisions. Economically, a balanced power structure 
is able to achieve equilibrium from the perspective of the entire supply chain, which is often 
acknowledged in the existing economic and supply chain management literature (Zhang et al. 2012; Chen 
and Wang 2015). However, to achieve environmental and social sustainability, it is essential to have a 
channel leadership to drive the sustainability agenda. It is also crucial for governments to develop new 
policies and incentives to encourage companies to take a leadership role in investing in and implementing 
new sustainability initiatives.  
6 Extended models 
In this section, we extend the aforementioned models via considering the demand function that is both 
price and carbon emissions sensitive, i.e. 𝑞 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝 − 𝛾(𝑒𝑚 + 𝑒𝑟), where 𝛾 means carbon emissions 
sensitivity. Other assumptions in the extended models are the same as those in the basic models, and can 
be referred to Table 2. Similar to the basic models, first, we also derive the manufacturer’s and retailer’s 
optimal decisions with the carbon emissions tax under three power structure situations (𝑖 = 𝑚, 𝑟, 𝑛 ). 
Second, based on these optimal decisions, we conduct a numerical analysis to reveal the optimal carbon 
tax in each power structure and the effects of power structure on the supply chain’s unit carbon emissions. 
6.1 Optimal carbon tax 
6.1.1 Optimal carbon tax in the asymmetric supply chain power structure 
In this subsection, we discuss the optimal ratio of carbon emissions tax absorbed by the manufacturer in 
the asymmetric supply chain power structure (MS and RS) models from the perspective of obtaining the 
supply chain’s unit carbon emissions minimization and profit maximization. We set 𝛼 = 20 , 𝑐 = 1 , 




   
(3a) MS model         (3b) RS model  
Figure 3. Optimal carbon tax in asymmetric supply chain power structure (𝜽𝒎 and 𝜽𝒓). 
Figure 3 shows the same results as those in Theorem 1, that is, to achieve the unit carbon emissions 
minimization and the economic performance maximization of the supply chain, the optimal carbon 
emissions taxation is to tax the follower in the asymmetric supply chain power structures (𝜃𝑖). And this 
optimal tax policy depends on the power structure rather than the green technology investment cost 
coefficients (𝑡𝑚 or 𝑡𝑟). Therefore, the policy makers can also design optimal carbon emissions taxation 
similar to the policy that is referred to Theorem 1. 
6.1.2 Optimal carbon tax in the symmetric supply chain power structure 
Similarly, we discuss the optimal ratio of carbon emissions tax absorbed by the manufacturer in the 
extended model in the symmetric supply chain power structure from the perspective of balancing the 
supply chain’s unit carbon emissions and profit. To this end, we set 𝛼 = 20, 𝑐 = 1, 𝛽 = 1, 𝛾 = 1.5, 
𝑒0 = 4.5, 𝑡𝑟 = 5 and 𝜏 = 0.5. Then, the results are shown in Figure 4. 
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Region I: the region of




Similar to Theorem 2, Figure 4 means that the optimal ratios (𝜃𝑛) exist and are affected by the 
relationship between the manufacturer’s green investment cost coefficient (𝑡𝑚) and the retailer’s green 
investment cost coefficient (𝑡𝑟) to balance the goal of minimizing unit carbon emissions and maximizing 
profit of the supply chain. Notably, the optimal ratio is also determined by two thresholds, the high 
threshold (7.875) and the low threshold (3.358) that are relevant to the carbon emissions sensitivity (𝛾), 
which are different from the thresholds in the basic models. Similar to the basic models, when the 
manufacturer’s green investment cost coefficient is higher than the high threshold or lower than the low 
threshold, only taxing the firm with greater emissions reduction efficiency is optimal. When the 
manufacturer’s green investment cost coefficient is between the two thresholds, the optimal ratio (𝜃𝑛) is 
within the regions I(a) and I(b), and the firm with a lower green investment cost coefficient will be 
collected a higher carbon emissions tax. 
6.2 The power structure effect 
Figures 3 and 4 show that the optimal carbon ratio absorbed by the manufacturer in three power structure 
models, respectively. Therefore, we can obtain the following remark: 
Remark 2: 𝜽𝒎 ≤ 𝜽𝒏 ≤ 𝜽𝒓. 
Remark 2 indicates the same result as Corollary 1 in the basic models, that is, the supply chain power 
structure can significantly affect the optimal carbon emissions tax design to balance the environmental 
and economic performances. More amply, under the situation where the manufacturer has the highest 
(lowest) power, the optimal ratio of carbon emissions tax absorbed by the manufacturer is lowest (highest). 
Next, the effects of the power structure on the supply chain’s unit carbon emissions are revealed 
under the scenario where the optimal ratio of carbon emissions tax from the perspective of minimising 
the carbon emissions and maximising the profit (𝜃𝑖) is designed. To focus on the power structure effects 
and exclude the effect of the green technology investment cost coefficients (𝑡𝑚 or 𝑡𝑟), we let 𝑡𝑚 = 𝑡𝑟 =
𝑡 as the basic models do. Furthermore, we set 𝛼 = 20, 𝑐 = 1, 𝛽 = 1, 𝑒0 = 4.5 and 𝜏 = 0.5, then the 





Figure 5. Effect of supply chain power structure on unit carbon emissions. 






𝑛𝑡 and 𝑒𝑚𝑡 = 𝑒𝑟𝑡 < 𝑒𝑛𝑡 ; 






𝑛𝑡 and 𝑒𝑚𝑡 = 𝑒𝑟𝑡 > 𝑒𝑛𝑡. Figure 
5 reveals that in the extended models, the power structure effects on the supply chain’s unit carbon 
emissions are relevant to carbon emissions sensitivity (𝛾 ) and the green technology investment cost 
coefficient (𝑡), which are different to the results in Theorem 3 in the basic models. More specifically, 
Region I depicts that if carbon emissions sensitivity is low (0 < 𝛾 ≤ 0.5 ), which means customers 
concern less about carbon emissions than product price, then the manufacturer and retailer may not be 
willing to reduce carbon emissions. In this case, taxing the follower can push the leader to adjust its 
carbon emissions reduction decisions according to the follower’s response functions, and that leads the 
unit carbon emissions in the asymmetric power structure to be lower than that in the symmetric power 
structure. Besides, Region I also shows that if carbon emissions can affect significantly customers’ 
demands for product and the manufacturer’s and retailer’s carbon emissions reduction efficiency is high 
(𝛾 > 0.5 and 𝑡 <
(1+2𝛾)2(1+4𝛾)
16(2𝛾−1)
), then taxing the follower can also gain remarkable effects on carbon 
emissions reduction in the asymmetric power structure than taxing both the manufacturer and retailer in 
the symmetric power structure, due to the former policy can stimulate the leader to adjust its decisions 
about carbon emissions reduction. 
In contrast, Region II depicts that if both the carbon emissions sensitivity and the green technology 
investment cost coefficient are high (𝛾 > 0.5 and 𝑡 <
(1+2𝛾)2(1+4𝛾)
16(2𝛾−1)
), which means customers concern 
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reduction, then in this case, taxing both the manufacturer and retailer in the symmetric power structure is 
conducive to reduce carbon emissions. When firms have difficulties in reducing carbon emissions, taxing 
the follower along may ease its effort in carbon emissions reduction to decrease the cost of the green 
technology investment. However, taxing the manufacturer and retailer can share the cost of carbon 
emissions tax so as to stimulate the two firms to reduce carbon emissions more.  
7 Managerial relevance and insights 
Our results generate some interesting findings. For instance, we show that a properly designed carbon 
emissions tax can be a regulatory mechanism for carbon emissions reduction while maintaining economic 
competitiveness for supply chains whether considering customers’ carbon emissions sensitivity or not. 
We also prove that the optimal carbon tax design is influenced by the supply chain power structure. 
Therefore, in designing the carbon emissions tax, it is critical to consider the power structure. Specifically, 
in the symmetric supply chain power structure, the allocation of the carbon emissions tax also depends 
on the relationship between the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s green technology investment cost 
coefficients. In addition, the optimal decision on green technology investment is mainly influenced by 
the carbon emissions reduction efficiency of supply chain members. The optimal carbon emissions tax 
design will encourage both the manufacturer and the retailer to properly invest in green technologies to 
reduce carbon emissions under different supply chain power structures. Furthermore, our results also 
reveal that an optimal carbon tax design yields better environmental performance under an asymmetric 
power structure than that under a symmetric power structure when not considering customers’ carbon 
emissions sensitivity. We uncover that an imbalanced supply chain power relationship is more likely to 
achieve environmental sustainability because an improvement in the supply chain’s sustainability 
performance often requires a channel leadership to drive the sustainability agenda and take on new 
initiatives such as green technology investment. Interestingly, when considering customers’ carbon 
emissions sensitivity, an optimal carbon tax design yields opposite results, namely the environmental 
performance is better in a symmetric power structure if customers are more sensitive to the carbon 
emissions yet the firms’ carbon emissions reduction efficiency is low. That because taxing the 
manufacturer and retailer can share the cost of carbon emissions tax so as to stimulate the two firms to 
reduce carbon emissions more. Finally, carbon taxation is one policy measure that governments can use 




to invest in green technologies to improve their energy efficiency and decrease their unit carbon emissions. 
Our findings indicate that firms’ optimal decision on green technology investment is mainly influenced 
by their cost efficiencies in carbon emissions reduction. There are two important thresholds for the green 
investment cost coefficient, which directly affect the decision on the optimal design of the carbon 
emissions tax, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
Furthermore, from the perspective of policy makers, our research findings provide interesting 
insights on how the level of the carbon emissions tax and the method of tax collection affect the economic 
and environmental performances of the entire supply chain. As opposed to some works in the economic 
literature that call for a carbon tax that should not be differentiated across sectors in the economy (Hoel 
1996), our findings demonstrate it is not ideal to have one single carbon emissions tax for all industry 
sectors. Unique characteristics of the industry sector (e.g. supply chain power structure) and the economic 
circumstances of the sector should be considered in the development of carbon emissions taxation scheme. 
Furthermore, a good use of carbon tax revenue is equally important to drive a low carbon economy. When 
deciding the use of carbon tax revenue, policy makers should consider the supply chain parties’ 
technology investment efficiencies and develop incentives for firms to invest in green technologies that 
can help to further reduce carbon emissions. For instance, various incentives have been given to different 
industry sectors by countries, e.g., China and the UK to encourage firms to invest on renewable energies 
and green technologies. This research is not only valuable for countries that plan to introduce the carbon 
emissions tax but also beneficial for countries that have already implemented carbon taxation to re-
examine their current carbon control policies. For instance, our findings suggest a fundamental trade-off 
between economic efficiency and environmental sustainability. It is crucial for policy makers to balance 
this and other trade-offs considering their countries’ development stage as well as their immediate and 
long-term economic and environmental challenges. As one notable example, the UK government has 
recently reduced the carbon tax level for the steel sector as one of the measures for addressing the crisis 
faced by the UK steel industry. Our findings will support policy makers in implementing comprehensive 
carbon emissions reduction policies that support their nations’ long-term sustainability. 
8 Conclusion and future research 
As a result of the international agreement on climate change signed at the United Nations Paris Climate 




governments and business enterprises all around the world. Undoubtedly, a thoughtfully designed carbon 
tax will play a significant role in achieving the carbon emissions reduction target. This research responds 
to the related timely challenges by analytically examining the optimal design of the carbon emissions tax 
by studying supply chain systems and the resulting economic and environmental performances.  
This research makes several important contributions. Theoretically, we complement the existing 
literature on the carbon emissions tax by analysing the optimal carbon emissions tax design by exploring 
various critical supply chain features and the associated economic and environmental performances. 
Different from the examination of the carbon emissions tax from the macroeconomic perspective 
(Wissema and Dellink 2007; Mathur and Morris 2014) and the optimisation of supply chain decisions 
under different carbon tax schemes (Choi 2013a; Choi 2013b; Wang et al. 2015a), our approach provides 
a practical and innovative approach of examining the efficacy of government policies. Furthermore, 
different industry sectors (e.g., steel, construction, telecommunication, retailing, and many others) have 
their distinctive supply chain power relationships, investment efficiencies and customers’ carbon 
emissions sensitivity in carbon emissions reduction. Through considering the effects of supply chain 
power structures and green technology investment efficiencies on the optimal carbon emissions tax design, 
we also contribute to the “power (or supply chain leadership)” literature (Touboulic et al. 2014; Du et al. 
2015; Chen and Hao 2015; Park et al. 2015; Chen et al. 2017; Wang et al. 2018) and the green technology 
investment literature (Krass et al. 2013; Drake et al. 2015; Bi et al. 2017; Han et al. 2017; Li et al. 2019) 
in the context of the sustainable supply chain management. Practically, we have derived the optimal 
solutions under the carbon emissions tax, helping firms make optimal operational and technology 
investment decisions to improve their economic and environmental performances.  
There are several possible extensions for future investigation. First, our model assumes a supply chain 
that consists of one manufacturer and one retailer with a deterministic demand. Although this simple 
configuration enables researchers to effectively model supply chain decisions and draw interesting 
insights from the analysis, one important extension would be to consider more complex supply chain 
systems (Choi et al. 2019), such as the ones with multiple manufacturers and retailers. Multi-echelon 
supply chains with Cournot competitions (Guo et al. 2020) are generally tractable, which enables the 
robustness of the results to be tested in a more general setting. Such research will certainly generate some 
interesting findings but will also require a new set of models. Finally, this research can be extended to the 




given that achieving the objective of a low-carbon economy requires both regulatory policies and market 
mechanisms.      
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Proof of Table 3 
Case 1: Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) model 




 and 𝑡𝑟 >
𝛽𝜏2
4
 . These assumptions are mathematical conditions for 
making the Hessian Matrix be negatively definite so that closed-form analysis is feasible. 
From (2), we obtain 𝜋𝑟(𝑝, 𝑒𝑟) = [𝑝 − 𝑤 − (1 − 𝜃)𝜏(𝑒𝑚 + 𝑒𝑟)](𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝) − 𝑡𝑟(𝑒0 − 𝑒𝑟)
2 , then 
𝜕2𝜋𝑟(𝑝,𝑒𝑟)
𝜕𝑝2
= −2𝛽 < 0 , 
𝜕2𝜋𝑟(𝑝,𝑒𝑟)
𝜕𝑒𝑟

















| = 𝛽[4𝑡𝑟 − 𝛽(1 − 𝜃)
2𝜏2] > 0. That is, 𝜋𝑟(𝑝, 𝑒𝑟) is jointly concave in 𝑝 



















From (1), we obtain 𝜋𝑚(𝑤, 𝑒𝑚) = [𝑤 − 𝑐 − 𝜃𝜏(𝑒𝑚 + 𝑒𝑟)](𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝) − 𝑡𝑚(𝑒0 − 𝑒𝑚)
2 . Replace 
𝑝𝑚  and 𝑒𝑟








< 0 , 
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> 0. That is, 𝜋𝑚(𝑤, 𝑒𝑚) is jointly concave 
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Case 2: Retailer Stackelberg (RS) model 
We assume that 𝑡𝑚 >
2𝛽𝜏2𝑡𝑟
8𝑡𝑟−𝛽𝜏
2 and 𝑡𝑟 >
𝛽𝜏2
4
. These assumptions are mathematical conditions for making 
the Hessian Matrix be negatively definite to derive closed-form insights. 
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From (2), we get 𝜋𝑟(𝑝, 𝑒𝑟) = [𝑝 − 𝑤 − (1 − 𝜃)𝜏(𝑒𝑚 + 𝑒𝑟)](𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝) − 𝑡𝑟(𝑒0 − 𝑒𝑟)
2 . Replace 
𝑤𝑟  and 𝑒𝑚
𝑟   into 𝜋𝑟(𝑝, 𝑒𝑟) , then 
𝜕2𝜋𝑟(𝑝,𝑒𝑟)
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Case 3: Nash model 
We assume that 𝑡𝑚 >
𝛽𝜏2
4
 and 𝑡𝑟 >
𝛽𝜏2
4
. These assumptions are mathematical conditions for making the 
Hessian Matrix be negatively definite to derive closed-form insights. 
From (2), we obtain 𝜋𝑟(𝑝, 𝑒𝑟) = [𝑝 − 𝑤 − (1 − 𝜃)𝜏(𝑒𝑚 + 𝑒𝑟)](𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝) − 𝑡𝑟(𝑒0 − 𝑒𝑟)
2 , then 
𝜕2𝜋𝑟(𝑝,𝑒𝑟)
𝜕𝑝2
= −2𝛽 < 0 , 
𝜕2𝜋𝑟(𝑝,𝑒𝑟)
𝜕𝑒𝑟

















| = 𝛽[4𝑡𝑟 − 𝛽(1 − 𝜃)
2𝜏2] > 0. So, 𝜋𝑟(𝑝, 𝑒𝑟) is jointly concave in 𝑝 and 𝑒𝑟.  
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= 0 , we obtain 𝑤𝑛 =
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Proof of Theorem 1 
(1) From the perspective of the supply chain’s environmental performance 
In the MS model, from Table 3, we obtain 𝑒𝑚 = 𝑒𝑚
𝑚 + 𝑒𝑟















2 > 0 ; 
that is, 𝑒𝑚 is an increasing function of 𝜃. Because 𝜃 ∈ [0,1], when 𝜃𝑚𝑐 = 0, 𝑒𝑚 is the minimum. 
In the RS model, from Table 3, we obtain 𝑒𝑟 = 𝑒𝑚
𝑟 + 𝑒𝑟

















2 < 0; that is, 𝑒
𝑟 is a decreasing function of 𝜃. Because 𝜃 ∈ [0,1], 
when 𝜃𝑟𝑐 = 1, 𝑒𝑟 is the minimum. 
(2) From the perspective of the supply chain’s profit 











































𝑚) and 𝜋𝑚 are all decreasing functions of 𝜃. Hence, when 𝜃𝑚𝑝 =
0, the manufacturer, the retailer and the supply chain with green technology investment will all obtain the 
maximum profits.   











































𝑟) and 𝜋𝑟 are all increasing functions of 𝜃 . Hence, when 𝜃𝑟𝑝 = 1 , the manufacturer, the 
retailer and the supply chain with green technology investment will all obtain the maximum profits.  
(3) From the perspective of the supply chain’s environmental performance and profit:  
From (1) and (2), we can directly get that to minimise the supply chain’s unit carbon emissions and 
maximise the supply chain’s total profit, 𝜃𝑚 = 0 and 𝜃𝑟 = 1. 
 
Proof of Lemma 1 
In the MS model, from Theorem 1, 𝜃𝑚 = 0, then 𝑇𝑚




























In the RS model, from Theorem 1, 𝜃𝑟 = 1, then 𝑇𝑚











































Proof of Theorem 2 
(1) From the perspective of the supply chain’s environmental performance: 







. If 𝑡𝑚 > 𝑡𝑟, 
𝑑𝑒𝑛
𝑑𝜃
> 0; that is, 𝑒𝑛 increases in 𝜃, 
then 𝜃𝑛𝑐 = 0; if 𝑡𝑚 = 𝑡𝑟, 
𝑑𝑒𝑛
𝑑𝜃
= 0; that is, 𝑒𝑛 is a constant of 𝜃, then 𝜃𝑛𝑐 can be an arbitrary value 
in the interval [0,1]; if 𝑡𝑚 < 𝑡𝑟, 
d𝑒𝑛
d𝜃
< 0; that is, 𝑒𝑛 decreases in 𝜃, then 𝜃𝑛𝑐 = 1.  
(2) From the perspective of the supply chain’s profit: 
















Let 𝑓(𝜃) = −𝜃(6𝑡𝑚 − 𝛽𝜏
2 + 6𝑡𝑟 − 𝛽𝜏
2) − 2𝑡𝑚 + 8𝑡𝑟 − 𝛽𝜏
2 . Since 𝑡𝑚 >
𝛽𝜏2
4




















1) When 8𝑡𝑟 − 2𝑡𝑚 − 𝛽𝜏








0; hence, 𝜃𝑛𝑝 = 0. 
2) When 8𝑡𝑟 − 2𝑡𝑚 − 𝛽𝜏
2 ≥ 0 and 2𝑡𝑟 − 8𝑡𝑚 + 𝛽𝜏








 , we 
obtain 0 ≤ 𝜃𝑟 ≤ 1 . Then, if 0 ≤ 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑟 , then 𝑓(𝜃) > 0 , 
d𝜋𝑛
d𝜃
> 0 ; if 𝜃𝑟 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1 , then 𝑓(𝜃) < 0 , 
d𝜋𝑛
d𝜃







3) When 2𝑡𝑟 − 8𝑡𝑚 + 𝛽𝜏








0; hence, 𝜃𝑛𝑝 = 1.  
(3) From the perspective of the supply chain’s environmental performance and profit: 
We take the intersection of the intervals of 𝑡𝑚 in (1) and (2) to minimise the supply chain’s unit carbon 
emissions and maximise profit simultaneously.  
1) From (1), if 𝑡𝑚 < 𝑡𝑟, then 𝜃




















≤ 𝑡𝑚 < 𝑡𝑟, 






2 ≤ 1. So there is no intersection between the two 







2 , 1]. 
2) From (1), if 𝑡𝑚 > 𝑡𝑟, then 𝜃


































2 > 0 . So there is no intersection between the two cases. Balancing the supply chain’s 







3) If 𝑡𝑚 = 𝑡𝑟, from (1), 𝜃
𝑛𝑐 is an arbitrary value in the interval [0,1]. From (2), 𝜃𝑛𝑝 =
1
2
. So to 




































, then 𝜃𝑛 =
0. 
 
Proof of Lemma 2 























> 0 , that is, 𝑇𝑚
𝑛 > 𝑇𝑟


























 , let 𝐵 = 𝑡𝑟𝜃
2 − 𝑡𝑚(1 − 𝜃)
















































> 0, that is, 𝑇𝑚
𝑛 > 𝑇𝑟












































= 0, that is, 𝑇𝑚
𝑛 = 𝑇𝑟
𝑛. 
In summary, if 𝑡𝑚 > 𝑡𝑟, then 𝑇𝑚
𝑛 < 𝑇𝑟
𝑛; if 𝑡𝑚 = 𝑡𝑟, then 𝑇𝑚
𝑛 = 𝑇𝑟




Proof of Theorem 3 
From Corollary 1, we obtain 𝜃𝑚𝑡 = 0 , 𝜃𝑛𝑡 =
1
2
 and 𝜃𝑟𝑡 = 1 . Recall Table 3:  When 𝜃𝑚𝑡 = 0 , we 
obtain 𝑒𝑚
𝑚𝑡 = 𝑒𝑟
𝑚𝑡 = 𝑒0 −
𝜏(𝛼−𝑐𝛽−2𝛽𝜏𝑒0)
8𝑡−3𝛽𝜏2
 ; when 𝜃𝑟𝑡 = 1 , we obtain 𝑒𝑚
𝑟𝑡 = 𝑒𝑟








𝑟𝑡. Additionally, because 𝑒𝑚







 , we obtain 𝑒𝑚
𝑛𝑡 = 𝑒𝑟
𝑛𝑡 = 𝑒0 −
𝜏(𝛼−𝑐𝛽−2𝛽𝜏𝑒0)
2(6𝑡−𝛽𝜏2)








. In the Nash model, when 𝑡𝑚 = 𝑡𝑟 = 𝑡, from the assumption, we can obtain 𝑡 >
𝛽𝜏2
4
. Thus, 6𝑡 − 𝛽𝜏2 > 0 and 
𝜏(𝛼−𝑐𝛽−2𝛽𝜏𝑒0)
8𝑡−3𝛽𝜏2











𝑛𝑡 and 𝑒𝑚𝑡 = 𝑒𝑟𝑡 < 𝑒𝑛𝑡.  
 
